Scoring rules serve to quantify predictive performance. A scoring rule is proper if truth telling is an optimal strategy in expectation. Subject to customary regularity conditions, every scoring rule can be made proper, by applying a special case of the Bayes act construction studied by Grünwald and Dawid (2004) and Dawid (2007) , to which we refer as properization. We discuss examples from the recent literature and apply the construction to create new types, and reinterpret existing forms, of proper scoring rules and consistent scoring functions. In an abstract setting, we formulate sufficient conditions under which Bayes acts exist and scoring rules can be made proper.
Introduction
Let B be a σ-algebra of subsets of a general sample space Ω. Let P be a convex class of probability measures on (Ω, B). A scoring rule is any extended real-valued function S on P × Ω such that S(P, Q) = S(P, ω) dQ(ω) is well-defined for P, Q ∈ P. The scoring rule S is proper relative to P if S(Q, Q) ≤ S(P, Q) for all P, Q ∈ P.
(1)
In words, we take scoring rules to be negatively oriented penalties that a forecaster wishes to minimize. If she believes that a future quantity or event has distribution Q, and the penalty for quoting the predictive distribution P when ω realizes is S(P, ω), then (1) implies that quoting P = Q is an optimal strategy in expectation. The scoring rule is strictly proper if (1) holds with equality only if P = Q. For recent reviews of the theory and application of proper scoring rules see Dawid (2007) , Gneiting and Raftery (2007) , Dawid and Musio (2014) , and Gneiting and Katzfuss (2014) . The intent of this note is to draw attention to the simple fact that, subject to customary regularity conditions, any scoring rule can be properized, in the sense that it can be modified in a straightforward way to yield a proper scoring rule, so that truth telling becomes an optimal strategy. Implicitly, this construction has recently been used by various authors in various types of applications; see, e.g., Diks et al. (2011) , Christensen et al. (2014) and Holzmann and Klar (2017) .
Theorem 1 (properization). Let S be a scoring rule. Suppose that for every P ∈ P there is a probability distribution P * ∈ P such that S(P * , P ) ≤ S(Q, P ) for all Q ∈ P.
Then the function S * : P × Ω →R, (P, ω) → S * (P, ω) = S(P * , ω),
is a proper scoring rule.
Here and in what follows we denote the real line by R and the extended real line byR := R ∪ {−∞, ∞}. Any probability measure P * with the property (2) is commonly called Bayes act; for the existence of Bayes acts, see Section 3. In case there are multiple minimizers of the expected score Q → S(Q, P ), the function S * is well-defined by using a mapping P → P * that chooses a P * out of the set of minimizers. If S is proper and P * = P , then S * = S, so the proper scoring rules are fixed points under the properization operator.
Importantly, Theorem 1 is a special case of a general and powerful construction studied in detail by Grünwald and Dawid (2004) and Dawid (2007) . Specifically, given some action space A and a loss function L : A × Ω →R, suppose that for each P ∈ P there is a Bayes act a P ∈ A, such that
Then the function
is a proper scoring rule. Note the natural connection to decision-and utility-based scoring approaches, where the quality of a forecast is judged by the monetary utility of the induced acts and decisions (Granger and Pesaran, 2000; Granger and Machina, 2006; Ehm et al., 2016) . In the remainder of the paper we focus on the above special case in which the action domain A is the class P. In Section 2 we identify scattered results in the literature as prominent special cases of properization (Examples 1-4), and we use Theorem 1 to construct new proper scoring rules from improper ones (Examples 5-7). Section 3 gives sufficient conditions for the existence of Bayes acts and Section 4 contains a brief discussion. All proofs and technical details are moved to the Appendix.
Examples
This section starts with an example in which we review the ubiquitous misclassification error from the perspective of properization. We go on to demonstrate how Theorem 1 has been used implicitly to construct proper scoring rules in econometric, meteorological, and statistical strands of literature. The notion of properization simplifies and shortens the respective proofs of propriety, makes them much more transparent, and puts the scattered examples into a unifying and principled joint framework. Further examples show other facets of properization: The scoring rules constructed in Example 5 are original, and the discussion in Example 6 illustrates a connection to the practical problem of the treatment of observational uncertainty in forecast evaluation. Finally, Example 7 includes an instance of a situation in which properization fails. Example 1. Consider probability forecasts of a binary event, where Ω = {0, 1} and P is the class of the Bernoulli measures. We identify any P ∈ P with the probability p = P ({1}) ∈ [0, 1] and consider the scoring rules S 1 (P, ω) := 1 − pω − (1 − p)(1 − ω) and S 2 (P, ω) := |p − ω|.
The scoring rule S 1 corresponds to the mean probability rate (MPR) in machine learning (Ferri et al., 2009, p. 30) . The scoring rule S 2 was first considered by Dawid (1986) . It agrees with the special case c 1 = c 2 in Section 4.2 of Parry (2016) and corresponds to the mean absolute error (MAE) as discussed by Ferri et al. (2009, p. 30) .
1 Both S 1 and S 2 are improper with common Bayes act
As noted by Parry (2016) , the improper score S 2 shares its (concave) expected score function P → S 2 (P, P ) with the proper Brier score. This illustrates the importance of the second condition in Theorem 1 of Gneiting and Raftery (2007) : For a scoring rule S the (strict) concavity of the expected score function G(P ) := S(P, P ) is equivalent to the (strict) propriety of S only if, furthermore, −S(P, ·) is a subtangent of −G at P . and with the same properized score given by the zero-one rule
A case-averaged zero-one score is typically referred to as misclassification rate or misclassification error; undoubtedly, this is the most popular and most frequently used performance measure in binary classification. While the scoring rule S * is proper it fails to be strictly proper (Gneiting and Raftery, 2007, Example 4; Parry, 2016, Section 4.3) . Consequently, misclassification error has serious limitations as a performance measure, as persuasively argued by Harrell (2015, p. 258) , among others. Nevertheless, the scoring rule S * is proper, contrary to recent claims of impropriety in the blogosphere.
2
For the remainder of the section, let Ω = R and let B be the Borel σ-algebra. We let L be the class of Borel measures P with a Lebesgue density, p. Furthermore, we write P k for the measures with finite k-th moment and P + k for the subclasses when Dirac measures are excluded. Whenever it simplifies notation, we identify P with its cumulative distribution function
Example 2. Let S 0 be a proper scoring rule on some subclass P of L and let w be a nonnegative weight function such that 0
this score is improper unless the weight function is constant. Indeed, by Theorem 1 of Gneiting and Ranjan (2011) , the Bayes act P * under S has density
From this we see that the key statement in Theorem 1 of Holzmann and Klar (2017) constitutes a special case of Theorem 1. In the further special case in which S 0 is the logarithmic score, the properized score (3) recovers the conditional likelihood score of Diks et al. (2011) up to equivalence, as noted in Example 1 of Holzmann and Klar (2017) . For analogous results for consistent scoring functions see Theorem 5 of Gneiting (2011) and Example 2 of Holzmann and Klar (2017) .
Example 3. For a probability measure P ∈ P 4 , let µ P , σ 2 P , and γ P denote its mean, variance, and centered third moment. Let
2 See, e.g., http://www.fharrell.com/post/class-damage/ and http://www.fharrell. com/post/classification/.
be the 'trial score' in equation (16) of Christensen et al. (2014) . As Christensen et al. (2014) show in their Appendix A, any Bayes act P * under S has mean µ P + 1 2 γ P σ 2 P and variance
so properization yields the spread-error score,
which is proper relative to the class P Example 4. The predictive model choice criterion of Laud and Ibrahim (1995) and Gelfand and Ghosh (1998) uses the scoring rule S(P, y) = (y − µ P ) 2 + σ 2 P , where µ P and σ 2 P denote the mean and the variance of a distribution P ∈ P 2 , respectively. As pointed out by Gneiting and Raftery (2007) , this score fails to be proper. Specifically, any Bayes act P * under S has mean µ P and vanishing variance, so properization yields the ubiquitous squared error, S
The original scoring rules of Examples 3 and 4 can be interpreted as functions S : A × Ω → R in the Bayes act setting of Grünwald and Dawid (2004) and Dawid (2007) , where the action space A is given by R × [0, ∞). Hence, the properization method can be interpreted as an application of Theorem 3 of Gneiting (2011) to consistent scoring functions for elicitable two-dimensional functionals, as discussed by Fissler and Ziegel (2016) .
Detailed arguments and calculations for the subsequent examples are deferred to the Appendix.
Example 5. For α > 0 consider the scoring rule
where P is identified with its cumulative distribution function (CDF). For α = 2 this is the well known proper continuous ranked probability score (CRPS), as reviewed in Section 4.2 of Gneiting and Raftery (2007) . For α = 1 the score S α was proposed by Müller et al. (2005) , and Zamo and Naveau (2018) show in their Appendix A that for discrete distributions every Dirac measure in a median of P is a Bayes act. The same holds true for general distributions and for all α ∈ (0, 1]. If α > 1, the Bayes act P * under S α is given by
and all in all we see that properization of S α works for any α > 0. Moreover, in the case α > 1 the mapping P → P * is even injective. Consequently, if the class P is such that P * ∈ P and S α (P * , P ) is finite for P ∈ P, the properized score (3) is even strictly proper relative to P. If α ∈ (1, 2], this can be ensured by restricting S α to the class P 1 . For α > 2 the class P c of the Borel measures with compact support is a suitable choice.
Example 6. Friederichs and Thorarinsdottir (2012, p. 58) propose a modification of the CRPS that aims to account for observational error in forecast evaluation. Specifically, they consider the scoring rule
where Φ ∈ P + 1 represents additive observation error. This scoring rule fails to be proper, as for probability measures P, Q ∈ P 1 we have
where * denotes the convolution operator. Due to the strict propriety of the CRPS relative to the class P 1 , the unique Bayes act under S Φ is given by P * = P * Φ. Theorem 1 now gives the scoring rule S(P, y) := S Φ (P * , y), which is proper relative to P 1 .
In order to account for noisy observational data in forecast evaluation, equation (5) suggests using the scoring rule S(P, y) := CRPS(P * , y) if the noise is independent, additive, and has distribution Φ. This corresponds to predicting hypothetical true values, to which noise is added before they are compared to observations. The drawbacks of this approach and alternative techniques are discussed by Ferro (2017) . The associated issues in forecast evaluation remain challenges to the scientific community at large; see, e.g., Ebert et al. (2013) and Ferro (2017) .
Example 7. Let S be a scoring rule, and let Φ ∈ L be a distribution with Lebesgue density ϕ. Suppose P is a class of distributions such that P * Φ ∈ P for P ∈ P.
which is again a scoring rule. If S is proper, a Bayes act under S ϕ is given by P * = P * Φ, since S ϕ (P, Q) = S(P, Q * Φ) for Q ∈ P, and if S is strictly proper, the Bayes act is unique. Properization now gives the proper scoring rule S(P, y) := S ϕ (P * , y). An interesting special case emerges when substituting the CRPS for S. This leads to CRPS ϕ (P, y) = S Φ (P, y) + CRPS(Φ, Φ),
where S Φ is the scoring rule in the previous example. For another special case, let c > 0 and P ∈ L, to yield
which recovers the probability score of Wilson et al. (1999) . We have that PS c = 2c LinS ϕc , where LinS(P, y) := −p(y) is the improper linear score and ϕ c is a uniform density on [−c, c]. Properization is not feasible relative to sufficiently rich classes P, as Bayes acts fail to exist under both the linear score and the probability score. For details, see the Appendix.
Existence of Bayes acts
In Example 7 we presented a scoring rule that cannot be properized, due to the nonexistence of Bayes acts. This section addresses the question under which conditions on S and P a minimum of the expected score function exists. To illustrate the ideas, we start with a further example.
Example 8. Using the notation of Example 3, consider the normalized squared error,
as a scoring rule on the classes P 2,m of the Borel measures with variance at most m, and P 2 = ∪ m>0 P 2,m , respectively. Relative to P 2,m any Bayes act P * under S has mean µ P and variance m, so properization yields (non-normalized) squared error up to equivalence. Relative to P 2 however, there is no Bayes act, since increasing the variance will always lead to a smaller expected score.
We now turn to a general perspective and discuss sufficient conditions for the existence of Bayes acts. At first, consider a finite probability space Ω = {ω 1 , . . . , ω k }. In this situation, geometrical arguments yield sufficient conditions. In particular, a Bayes act under S exists if the risk set S := {(x 1 , . . . , x k ) | ∃ P ∈ P : x j = S(P, ω j ), j = 1, . . . , k} ⊂ R k is closed from below and bounded from below; see Theorem 1 in Chapter 2.5 of Ferguson (1967) . Extending this result to a general sample space Ω is non-trivial since in this case S can be a subset of an infinite-dimensional vector space. In the following we employ well-known concepts of functional analysis in order to discuss two possible extensions. All proofs are deferred to the Appendix.
Let P be a set of probability measures on a general probability space Ω and let A be a topological space. We return to the setting of Section 1 and consider functions S : A × Ω → R. This makes the results more general and easier to apply in situations where the scoring rule depends on P only via some finite number of parameters. Concerning the latter point, note that the normalized squared error of Example 8 can be written as a composition of the mapping P → (µ P , σ 2 P ) and the function s(x 1 , x 2 , y) := (y − x 1 ) 2 /x 2 , with s being defined on R × (0, ∞) × R. Consequently, the expected normalized squared error attains its minimum if the expected score of s attains its minimum. Note that such a decomposition of the scoring rule is possible for Examples 3 and 4 as well, as alluded to in the comments that succeed these examples.
We impose the following integrability assumption on S.
Definition 1. The mapping S : A × Ω → R is uniformly bounded from below if there exists a function g : Ω → R which is integrable with respect to any P ∈ P and such that S(a, ·) ≥ g holds for all a ∈ A.
Our first result is similar to Theorem 2 in Chapter 2.9 of Ferguson (1967) , which proves the existence of minimax decision rules.
Theorem 2. Suppose S is lower semicontinuous in its first component and uniformly bounded from below. If A is compact, then the function a → S(a, P ) attains its minimum for any P ∈ P.
This theorem can be used to prove the existence of a Bayes act for a given scoring rule. However, it is not applicable to Example 8. To see this, recall the decomposition of S mentioned above and note that restricting S to P 2,m corresponds to restricting s to R × (0, m]. The latter set is not a compact space and neither is its closure. Consequently, we aim to dispense with the compactness assumption used in Theorem 2.
To do so, we need additional concepts from functional analysis. Let X be a real normed vector space. Recall that a function h : X → R is called coercive if for any sequence (x n ) n∈N ⊂ X the implication
holds true, see, e.g. Definition III.5.7 in Werner (2018) . By weak topology on X , we mean the weakest topology such that all real-valued linear mappings on X are continuous; see, e.g. Chapters 2.13 and 6.5 in Aliprantis and Border (2006) . The space X is called a reflexive Banach space if it is complete and the canonical embedding of X into its bidual space is surjective; see, e.g. Chapter III.3 in Werner (2018) or Chapter 6.3 in Aliprantis and Border (2006) . Combining these concepts, we obtain a complement to Theorem 2.
Theorem 3. Let A be a weakly closed subset of a reflexive Banach space. Moreover, suppose S is weakly lower semicontinuous in its first component and uniformly bounded from below. If the function a → S(a, P ) is coercive, then it attains its minimum.
This result yields the existence of Bayes acts as long as the integrated scoring rule is coercive for any P ∈ P, where P is a reflexive Banach space. To conclude this section, we connect Theorem 3 to Example 8: The function s(·, ·, y) from the decomposition of S mentioned above is defined on R × (0, ∞), which is a subset of the reflexive Banach space R 2 . Moreover, s is bounded from below by zero and continuous in its first component. As mentioned above, restricting the class P 2 to P 2,m corresponds to restricting the domain of s to R × (0, m] and in this situation, integrating s with respect to y gives a coercive function. Consequently, Theorem 3 can be used to show that S can be properized if restricted to P 2,m .
Discussion
In this article we have introduced the concept of properization, which is rooted in the Bayes act construction of Grünwald and Dawid (2004) and Dawid (2007) , and we have drawn attention to its widespread implicit use in the transdisciplinary literature on proper scoring rules, where our unified approach yields simplified, shorter, and considerably more instructive and transparent proofs than extant methods. Moreover, using new examples, we have demonstrated the power of the properization approach in the creation of new proper scoring rules from existing improper ones.
Since the central element in the construction of a properized score is a Bayes act, we have discussed conditions on the scoring rule S and the class P that guarantee its existence. Undoubtedly, there are alternative paths to existence results in the spirit of Theorems 2 and 3, and the derivation of sufficient conditions in alternative situations is an interesting open problem. Furthermore, we have not explored necessary conditions for the existence of Bayes acts in this work. Their derivation and the refinement of sufficient conditions on S and P remain challenges that we leave for future work.
Appendix: Proofs
Here we present detailed arguments for the technical claims in Examples 5, 6, and 7 as well as the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3.
Details for Example 5
We fix some distribution P and start with the case α > 1. An application of Fubini's theorem gives
Given x ∈ R we seek the value Q(x) ∈ [0, 1] that minimizes the inner integral in (7). If x is such that P (x) ∈ {0, 1}, the equality 1(y ≤ x) = P (x) holds for P -almost all y, hence Q(x) = P (x) is the unique minimizer. If x satisfies P (x) ∈ (0, 1), define the function
which is strictly convex in q ∈ (0, 1) with derivative
and a unique minimum at q = q * x,P ∈ (0, 1). As a consequence, the minimizing value Q(x) is given by
The function Q defined by the minimizers Q(x), x ∈ R is a minimizer of S α (·, P ) and if S α (Q, P ) is finite, it is unique Lebesgue almost surely. Since α > 1 the function Q has the properties of a distribution function and hence P * defined by (4) is a Bayes act for P . Moreover, equation (4) shows that the relation between P and P * is one-to-one. It remains to be checked under which conditions the properization of S α is not only proper but strictly proper. The representation (4) along with two Taylor expansions implies that P * behaves like P 1/(α−1) in the tails. This has two consequences. At first, the above arguments show that for S α (P * , P ) to be finite x → g x,P (P * (x)) has to be integrable with respect to Lebesgue measure. Hence, the tail behavior of P * and the inequality α/(α − 1) > 1 for α > 1 show that S α (P * , P ) is finite for P ∈ P 1 . Second, P * has a lighter tail than P for α ∈ (1, 2) and a heavier tail for α > 2. In the latter case P ∈ P 1 does not necessarily imply P * ∈ P 1 . Hence, without additional assumptions, strict propriety of the properized score (3) can only be ensured relative to P c for α > 2 and relative to the class P 1 for α ∈ (1, 2].
We now turn to α ∈ (0, 1). In this case, the function g x,P is strictly concave, and its unique minimum is at q = 0 for P (x) < 1 2 and at q = 1 for P (x) > 1 2
. If
, then both 0 and 1 are minima. Arguing as above, every Bayes act P * is a Dirac measure in a median of P .
Finally, α = 1 implies that g x,P is linear, thus, as for α ∈ (0, 1), every Dirac measure in a median of P is a Bayes rule. The only difference to the case α ∈ (0, 1) is that if there is more than one median, there are Bayes acts other than Dirac measures, since g x,P is constant for all x satisfying P (x) = 1 2 .
Details for Example 6
Let P, Q and Φ be distribution functions. By the definition of the convolution operator
holds for x ∈ R. Using this identity and Fubini's theorem leads to
which verifies equality in (5). Moreover, the strict propriety of the CRPS relative to the class P 1 gives S Φ (P, Q) < ∞ for P, Q, Φ ∈ P 1 , thereby demonstrating that the Bayes act is unique in this situation.
Details for Example 7
For distributions P, Q ∈ P and c > 0, the Fubini-Tonelli theorem and the definition of the convolution operator give
so the stated (unique) Bayes act under S ϕ follows from the (strict) propriety of S. Proceeding as in the details for Example 6 we verify identity (6).
For P ∈ L the same calculations as above show that the probability score satisfies
where LinS(P, y) = −p(y) is the linear score. Consequently, to demonstrate that Theorem 1 is neither applicable to PS c nor to LinS, it suffices to show that there is a distribution Q such that P → LinS(P, Q) does not have a minimizer. We use an argument that generalizes the construction in Section 4.1 of Gneiting and Raftery (2007) who show that LinS is improper. Let q be a density, symmetric around zero and strictly increasing on (−∞, 0). Let > 0 and define the interval I k := ((2k − 1) , (2k + 1) ] for k ∈ Z. Suppose p is a density with positive mass on some interval I k for k = 0. Due to the properties of q, the score LinS(P, Q) can be reduced by substituting the density defined bỹ p(x) := p(x) − 1(x ∈ I k ) p(x) + 1(x + 2k ∈ I k ) p(x + 2k ) for p, i.e., by shifting all probability mass from I k to the modal interval I 0 . Repeating this argument for any > 0 shows that no density p can be a minimizer of the expected score LinS(P, Q). Note that the assumptions on q are stronger than necessary in order to facilitate the argument. They can be relaxed at the cost of a more elaborate proof.
Proof of Theorem 2
Let (a n ) n∈N ⊂ A be a sequence with a := lim n→∞ a n . Since S is lower semicontinuous in its first component and uniformly bounded from below by g, Fatou's lemma gives lim inf n→∞ S(a n , ω) dP (ω) ≥ lim inf n→∞ S(a n , ω) dP (ω) ≥ S(a, P ) for any P ∈ P. Hence, a → S(a, P ) is a lower semicontinuous function for any P ∈ P and due to the assumed compactness of A, the result now follows from Theorem 2.43 in Aliprantis and Border (2006) .
Proof of Theorem 3
The same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 2 show that a → S(a, P ) is a weakly lower semicontinuous function for any P ∈ P. If P ∈ P is such that this function is also coercive, then proceeding as in the proof of Satz III.5.8 in Werner (2018) gives a weakly convergent sequence (a n ) n∈N ⊂ A with lim n→∞ S(a n , P ) = inf a∈A S(a, P ). Since A is weakly closed by assumption, it contains the weak limit a * of the sequence (a n ) n∈N and hence weak lower semicontinuity implies that a → S(a, P ) attains its minimum at a * ∈ A.
